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Abstract 
The possible negative consequences of counterfactuals were explored in the current study 
by examining the relationship between counterfactual direction and trait procrastination, a self-
defeating behavioral style. Eighty participants generated counterfactuals in response two 
experimental anxiety inductions. Trait procrastination was overall related to avoiding thoughts 
about how things could have been better (making more downward and relatively fewer upward 
counterfactuals) in response to the two anxiety-provoking scenarios, suggesting the involvement 
of a self-enhancement motive (mood repair). Evidence for the involvement of this self-motive in 
procrastinating behavior also emerged, as procrastination was more related to making more 
downward counterfactuals for a delay-specific anxiety scenario than for a general anxiety 
scenario. The pattern of results supports the proposal that downward counterfactuals may be 
associated with negative behavioral styles such as procrastination, and implicates self-
enhancement motives in this relationship. The behavioral and motivational consequences of 
downward counterfactuals are discussed, and possible connections between downward 
counterfactuals and other self-defeating behaviors are presented. 
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Procrastination and counterfactual thinking: Avoiding what might have been 
Counterfactual thoughts are mental simulations of possible outcomes that did not happen 
but can be imagined as having occurred (Sanna, Chang, & Meier, 2001). Often these thoughts 
occur in response to negative life events prompting reflection about better possible outcomes 
(upward counterfactuals). Alternatively, some individuals may focus on how things could have 
been much worse (downward counterfactuals) but were not.   
A growing body of research has focused on the affective and behavioral consequences of 
counterfactual thinking, and the benefits that may derive from differences in counterfactual 
direction. Although upward counterfactuals may result in negative mood as one ponders what 
could have occurred to improve an outcome but did not, these thoughts about what might have 
been can also heighten success-enhancing intentions and behaviors by making salient things that 
can be done to improve future outcomes (Boninger, Gleicher, & Strathman, 1994; Gleicher, 
Boninger, Strathman, Armor, & Ahn, 1995; Roese, 1994; Roese & Olson, 1996). In contrast, by 
focusing on how an outcome could have been worse but was not, downward counterfactuals can 
serve an affective function and be strategically used to improve mood in response to negative 
events (Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, & McMullen, 1993; Roese, 1994; Sanna, 1996).  
Research on individual differences in counterfactual direction across various situations 
has implicated possible self-motives involved in the preference for upward or downward 
counterfactuals, including self-improvement and self-enhancement (Sanna et al., 2001; Sanna, 
Meier, & Turley Ames, 1998; Sanna, Turley Ames, & Meier, 1999). Upward counterfactuals 
made in response to negative events can lead to self-improvement through highlighting ways to 
solve problems, or may serve a self-protective function by bracing one for possible failure 
(Sanna, 2000; Sanna et al., 2001). Studies comparing the counterfactuals of high and low self-
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esteem individuals indicate that people high in self-esteem make more downward counterfactuals 
in response to negative events or moods (Sanna et al., 1998; Sanna et al., 1999), and that this may 
reflect self-enhancement strategies, and mood repair in particular (Sanna et al., 1998). For 
example, acknowledging that one could have done something differently to change an outcome 
that is significant yet distressing, may threaten the self (Roese & Olson, 1993). Conversely, 
focusing on how things could have turned out worse but did not can restore a positive sense of 
self in response to negative events or bad moods by improving one’s mood (Sanna et al., 1999). 
Moreover, this process requires cognitive effort in order to achieve a mood that is incongruent 
with the initial event (Clark & Isen, 1982; Sanna et al., 1999). According to the self-motive 
model of counterfactual direction (Sanna, 2000; Sanna et al., 2001), a preference for downward 
counterfactuals in response to negative events or moods may reflect self-enhancement motives by 
providing a means to repair negative moods induced by an unpleasant outcome.  
 Although research has focused primarily on the positive affective and behavioral 
consequences of counterfactual thinking, the possible negative consequences related to 
counterfactual thinking has received less attention. It has been suggested that for some 
individuals, a preference for downward counterfactuals may lead to a trade-off between 
immediate affective self-enhancement and insights into behaviors that may enhance future 
outcomes (Boninger et al., 1994; Markman et al., 1993; Roese, 1994; Sanna, 1996). Thus, the 
chronic generation of self-protective counterfactuals may be dysfunctional for some individuals 
by decreasing the likelihood that ways to improve their behavior will be identified (Roese, 1994).  
 The focus of the current study was to examine the possible negative consequences of 
counterfactual direction by exploring the possible relationships between counterfactual thinking 
and a self-defeating behavioral style linked to both affect-regulation and self-enhancement 
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strategies: trait procrastination.  
Procrastination has been described as a self-regulation style that involves delay in the 
start and/or completion of a task (Ferrari & Tice, 2000), and involves not only behavioral self-
regulation issues, but also affective and cognitive components (Ferrari, 1991b; Rothblum, 
Solomon, & Murakami, 1986). A variety of negative outcomes have been linked to 
procrastination including poor academic performance (Beck, Koons, & Milgrim, 2000; Wesley, 
1994), higher stress (Flett, Blankstein, & Martin, 1995; Sirois, Melia-Gordon, & Pychyl, in press; 
Tice & Baumeister, 1997), increased illness (Sirois et al., in press; Tice & Baumeister, 1997), 
and higher anxiety when recalling procrastinating behavior (Lay, 1994). Given these troubling 
consequences it seems surprising that individuals who chronically procrastinate do not learn from 
their past behavior so that they can improve future outcomes. Instead, it is possible that 
procrastinators avoid acknowledging what might have been had they acted in a timely manner 
and thereby miss opportunities to reflect on possible corrective actions.  
 Several studies indicate that chronic procrastination is related to choices that put 
immediate affect regulation ahead of the long-term consequences of procrastinating behavior. 
Procrastinators tend to delay more on tasks viewed as aversive (Milgram, Marshevsky, & Sadeh, 
1994; Milgram, Sroloff, & Rosenbaum, 1988) often choosing more pleasurable, fun tasks over 
more challenging or unpleasant tasks (Blunt & Pychyl, 1998; Ferrari & Dovidio, 2000; Pychyl, 
Lee, Thibodeau, & Blunt, 2000). Furthermore, when people experience distress, short-term affect 
regulation accomplished through procrastination and other self-regulatory lapses may take 
precedence over the long-term implications of impulse control (Tice, Bratslavsky, & Baumeister, 
2001). 
One of the other possible benefits of valuing short-term mood regulation over the long-
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term consequences of failing to start or complete tasks is that it may help protect one’s self-
concept. One theory of the etiology of procrastination suggests that it is a strategy for protecting 
self-esteem, because avoiding task completion also means avoiding feedback about one’s 
abilities (Burka & Yuen, 1983). This information may be damaging to one’s self worth, whereas 
without feedback one can maintain beliefs about one’s abilities that may be overestimated 
(Haycock, McCarthy, & Skay, 1998). Accordingly, procrastinators will more frequently 
acknowledge reasons for their behavior that are less threatening to their self-image than admit to 
reasons that are more threatening (Milgram et al., 1994). Procrastinators also engage in self-
presentation strategies, such as self-handicapping (Ferrari, 1991d), aimed at enhancing their 
social image (Ferrari, 1992a), and as protection from public disapproval (Ferrari, 1991b).   
Indeed, trait procrastination is related to low self-esteem (Effert & Ferrari, 1989; Ferrari, 1991a; 
Ferrari, 1991b, 1994, 2000; Melia-Gordon, Sirois, & Pychyl, 2002; Senecal, Koestner, & 
Vallerand, 1995; Solomon & Rothblum, 1984), low self-confidence (Beswick, Rothblum, & 
Mann, 1988), and public self-consciousness (Ferrari, 1991b; Ferrari, 1992a).  
In delaying the start or completion of a task, procrastinators can avoid failure and the 
evaluation of their performance or abilities (Ferrari, Johnson, & McCown, 1995) and thus protect 
both social and self-esteem (Ferrari, 1991d). However, this short-term gain in self-worth 
protection may be at the expense of long-term improvements in ability and self-regulatory 
behavior. For example, Ferrari (1991c) found that procrastinators avoid self-relevant feedback in 
favor of non-diagnostic information, perhaps because they fear the evaluation of their abilities 
(Ferrari, 1991a).  
Together, this research suggests that procrastination is associated with active attempts to 
regulate immediate mood regardless of the consequences of this mood regulation (e.g., delay of 
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tasks, avoidance of feedback), and that these mood regulation attempts may also serve to protect 
and enhance their self-concept. Given these links between procrastination and self-enhancement, 
a self-motive proposed to underlie a preference for downward counterfactuals after negative 
events (Sanna et al., 2001), it is possible that chronic procrastinators may also have a tendency 
towards making more downward counterfactuals in response to negative events. 
In accordance with the self-motives model of counterfactual direction proposed by Sanna 
et al. (2001), avoiding thoughts about how things could have been better serve self-enhancing 
motives. It is possible that individuals high in procrastination engage in mood regulation by 
seeking immediate positive ways to feel good and avoid distress due to negative mood (e.g., Tice 
et al., 2001).  In addition, if the negative outcome is due to procrastination itself, then it is 
possible that attempts to shift mood may be related to reducing specific threats to self. By 
focusing on how the outcomes of procrastination are not as negative as they could have been 
(making downward counterfactuals), rather than on things that could have been done to avoid the 
negative consequences of procrastination (making upward counterfactuals), self-concept may be 
protected and positive feelings about oneself can be restored.  
The present study 
The goal of the current study was to demonstrate the possible negative consequences of 
downward counterfactuals by examining their relation to procrastination, a behavioral style 
linked to negative outcomes. In addition, this study explored the possible self-motives underlying 
this connection by examining how procrastination related to the direction of counterfactuals 
generated across two hypothetical anxiety provoking situations, one that involved delay and one 
that did not. 
Because one of the motives hypothesized to underlie this tendency was regulation of 
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negative affect, specifically anxiety, it was necessary to examine these associations after inducing 
a state of anxiety. Previous counterfactual research that has examined the effects of mood on 
counterfactual direction has focused on dysphoric affect, especially sadness, and employed a 
between-subjects comparison of counterfactuals generated after induction of positive and 
negative moods (e.g., Sanna et al., 1999). Instead, the present research used an anxiety-specific 
induction procedure in which both counterfactual generation and mood were manipulated within 
subjects. Rather than inducing mood independent of the counterfactual task, the anxiety 
induction was accomplished through the reading of the hypothetical counterfactual scenarios1.  
 To demonstrate that procrastination was associated with avoiding thoughts about how 
things could have been better, it was predicted that overall, trait procrastination would be related 
to a tendency to make more downward counterfactuals and relatively fewer upward 
counterfactuals in response to the two anxiety provoking scenarios. To examine the extent to 
which this tendency may be due to self-enhancement motives (i.e., to restore a positive sense of 
self), and affect regulation in particular (i.e., mood repair in response to a negative event), 
procrastination-specific self-threat was manipulated by using a scenario that included incidences 
of delayed action leading to an uncertain and potentially negative outcome. The other scenario 
described a general situation of uncertainty where delay was not involved, but the outcome was 
also negative. If mood repair underlies the tendency to avoid thoughts about how things could 
have been better then procrastination should be related to making more downward 
counterfactuals overall, that is across both situations. If, however, procrastination is related to the 
generation of more downward counterfactuals in response to the procrastination scenario only, 
then this would suggest that perhaps self-enhancement motives are most salient for 
procrastinators when negative outcomes are related to delay behavior, and further that 
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counterfactual thinking may be involved in the maintenance of this self-defeating behavior. Each 
of these hypotheses is contingent on the equivalence of both scenarios in inducing anxiety. 
Finally, the effect of trait procrastination on counterfactual direction relative to self-
esteem was also examined. Self-esteem is associated with making fewer upward counterfactuals 
when negative moods are induced (Sanna et al., 1998; Sanna et al., 1999), and global self worth 
is also negatively related to procrastination (e.g., Ferrari & Tice, 2000). Accounting for any 
effects due to self-esteem would help clarify the relationship of procrastination to counterfactual 
direction.  
Methods 
Participants 
The study sample consisted of 81 undergraduate psychology students who responded to 
the anxiety induction (see data screening section for details). Data from one subject were 
discarded for failure to complete the counterfactual task. This left a final sample of 80 (57 
females, 23 males), with a mean age of 19.5 years (SD = 1.87). All students received extra course 
credit for their participation.  
Procedure and measures 
Upon arriving at the laboratory, individuals were provided with a cover story that 
indicated that the study examined how different people react to uncertainty and how this relates 
to well-being. One to two people were tested in each experimental session. Participants were 
randomly assigned2 to one of the two scenario presentation order conditions (delay then general, 
general then delay) in this within subjects design. 
The experiment was conducted in one three-part session.  In the first part, participants 
completed a self-report questionnaire package that included a baseline assessment of state 
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anxiety. Questions about background demographic and health information, as well as several 
personality measures were also included. Only those measures analyzed for the current study are 
presented here.  
Procrastination. Trait procrastination was assessed with Lay’s General Procrastination 
scale (GP; Lay, 1986).  This 20-item scale assesses global tendencies towards procrastination 
across a variety of daily tasks. Items such as “I am continually saying I’ll do it tomorrow.“ are 
scored on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 for false of me to 5 for true of me. The scale 
includes 10 reverse-scored items, and the mean of all items yields a single composite score with 
high values indicating a higher tendency to procrastinate. The GP has demonstrated good internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.82; Lay, 1986), and good stability with a test-retest reliability 
of .80 (Ferrari, 1989). The internal consistency for the current sample was very good (Cronbach’s 
alpha = .89). Ferrari (1992b) suggests that the GP is an effective measure of procrastinating 
behavior across different situations. 
State anxiety. Baseline and post-scenario levels of state anxiety were assessed with the 
State-trait anxiety inventory, form Y-1 (STAI; Spielberger, 1983). This self-report measure is a 
widely used and well-validated means of assessing the current level of anxiety experienced. It has 
also been found to be a sensitive indicator of changes in state anxiety, and has been used 
extensively in assessing levels of experimentally induced anxiety (Spielberger, Gorsuch, 
Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983).  The STAI S-Anxiety scale consists of 20 items that assess the 
extent of current feelings of apprehension, tension, nervousness and worry on a 4-point Likert 
scale ranging from 1 for not at all to 4 for very much so. Half of the items are reverse scored 
before summing all items to get a total state anxiety score. The STAI has demonstrated very good 
internal consistency across a variety of adult samples, with alphas ranging from .86 to .95 
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(Spielberger et al., 1983). 
Self-Esteem. The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES; (Rosenberg, 1965) was used to 
assess global feelings of self-esteem. The scale consists of 10 items about one’s sense of self 
worth (e.g., “I take a positive view of myself.”; “All in all, I am inclined to think of myself as a 
failure.”) each answered on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) to 3 
(strongly agree). Half of the items are reverse scored and a total self-esteem score is obtained by 
summing across the 10 items (Brown & Mankowski, 1993).  
Following the completion of the initial questionnaire package, participants were given a 
short break in order to minimize task demands. This was accomplished by informing the 
participants that the experimenter needed some time to set up the materials for the next session. 
The procedure for each of the second and third segments of the study was identical and involved 
mood induction followed by counterfactual generation and a mood neutralization task. Each 
participant received the two scenarios, one per session, with the presentation order 
counterbalanced across the participants to prevent any order effects.  
Mood induction.  To induce anxiety, participants were instructed to read a scenario 
describing threatening events leading to an uncertain outcome and vividly imagine the events as 
if they were happening to them. One scenario described a health-related situation in which taking 
action to deal with a health problem was delayed several times:  
You have just returned from a vacation in Mexico. You suntanned everyday and spent a 
lot of time outdoors as you usually do when it is sunny out. Some things about the trip 
went well and some things went poorly. After putting on some cream to help maintain 
your tan, you realize that there is an odd shaped raised mole on your shoulder that is very 
sensitive when you touch it. You put some extra cream on it to soothe it and then forget 
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about it. About a month later you realize that the spot is becoming irritating and has 
grown in size.  You ask a friend if she has ever had this problem. She tells you that she 
experienced something similar and it turned out to be nothing more than a new mole 
developing, and that new moles are often itchy. Two weeks later you find you cannot 
stand the irritation any more and you drop by the health clinic to have it checked out. 
After asking you some questions about your sun tanning habits, the doctor looks very 
concerned as she states that she is going to schedule you an appointment with a doctor 
who knows more about skin problems. When you meet with the specialist one month 
later he asks if anyone in your family has had cancer. You tell him that both your 
grandmother and your aunt died from cancer. He does some tests, sends you home and 
says that you will be called when the test results are in. Several days later you receive a 
call asking you to come in person to the doctor’s to get the test results. When you arrive 
the doctor greets you with a concerned look. 
The health-related theme was chosen because previous research suggests that procrastination is 
associated with fewer health-protective behaviors and delay in seeking treatment for health 
problems (Sirois et al., in press). The second scenario depicted a more general situation of 
uncertainty that described coming home to find fire fighters trying to stop a fire that had just 
started next to one’s house just before midterms.  
It is midterm. You are living away from home for the first time.  You looked for housing 
all summer and finally found an affordable house in an ideal location with other 
roommates.  Upon walking home one day from classes, you notice that the air smells like 
smoke and the sky seems gray.  As you get closer to your street you hear the sound of 
sirens approaching and see a fire truck drive by.  You quicken your pace.  As you 
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approach your street you see a crowd gathered at the intersection nearest your house. As 
you arrive you see the firefighters walking on a steep ladder onto the roof of your house.  
You gasp and watch in horror as they proceed to take an axe and bash holes in the roof of 
the house and break all the windows. You notice that your heart is beating faster and your 
mouth is dry.  One of your neighbors approaches you and explains how the firefighters 
are trying to prevent the fire from spreading to your house.  You think about all of your 
clothing going up in smoke and the new stereo system that you have just bought with the 
last of your summer earnings. You realize that you don’t have insurance on your 
belongings.  There are also your textbooks and notes, and midterm exams are coming up 
next week.  You break out in a cold sweat.  One of the firefighters approaches you with a 
concerned look on his face and asks if you are one of the tenants in the building. 
Participants were instructed to read and vividly imagine themselves in the scenario for three 
minutes, after which the experimenter returned and administered a short questionnaire package 
that included the STAI to assess scenario-induced changes in anxiety. This package included 
other short personality questionnaires and a symptom checklist to help take the focus off the 
mood ratings, because as Sanna et al. (1999) have noted, some studies suggest that moods rated 
immediately before the task of interest may cause participants to discount their moods as a reason 
for behavior (Berkowitz & Trocolli, 1990). 
Counterfactual thoughts.  Following the completion of the post-scenario questionnaires, 
the participants were given the same scenario previously read and instructed again to vividly 
imagine the events as if they were happening to them. This time participants were provided with 
the following counterfactual instruction set similar to that used in previous counterfactual 
research (Sanna et al., 1999). 
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When faced with situations such as this, people often have thoughts like “if only” or “at 
least”.  Sometimes these thoughts can be about things that would have made the situation 
better, and these thoughts are about things that are better than what actually happened; 
sometimes these thoughts can be about things that would have made the situation worse, 
and these thoughts are about things that are worse than what actually happened. In the 
spaces below, please list things that might have been different that would have made the 
situation either better or worse. Please fill in as many that come to mind, but try to not 
take more than a couple of minutes on this task.  
This task was timed for 5 minutes, at which point the experimenter returned and administered a 
mood neutralization task that involved reading a happy ending to the scenario to compensate for 
scenario-induced anxiety. Following a short break, the participants returned and repeated the 
same procedure for the second scenario.  
Results  
Manipulation check and data screening 
Baseline scores on the STAI (M = 37.01, SD = 10.53) were comparable to the norms 
reported for college student samples (males, M = 36.47, SD = 10.02; females, M = 38.76, SD = 
11.95; Spielberger et al., 1983). The criterion for responsiveness to the anxiety induction was set 
at greater than 5 percent change from baseline to post scenario STAI score. Because the STAI 
has a 60 point range of possible scores (from 20 to 80), participants whose STAI scores changed 
by 3 points or less, or whose post-scenario STAI scores decreased relative to baseline, were 
considered to be unaffected by the mood manipulation. For each participant response had to 
occur for both of the scenarios to be included as a responder.  From the initial sample of 103 
students, 81 were selected as showing response to the anxiety induction and included in 
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subsequent analyses. Twenty students were not selected as they had 3 points or less change in 
their state anxiety post scenario scores, and another two students were also excluded because 
their change scores indicated that they experienced less anxiety after reading the scenarios.  
 Analyses were conducted to ensure that there were no effects due to presentation order of 
the two scenarios. Baseline STAI scores were comparable for both order groups (F(1,79) = .95, 
ns), and both order groups had comparable scores on the post delay scenario STAI (F(1,79) = 
.01, ns), and the post general scenario STAI (F(1,79) = .78, ns), indicating no order effects. The 
two scenarios were also analyzed to ensure equality in anxiety induction in order to assess the 
possible differential motives associated with counterfactual direction. A one sample t-test of the 
difference between the health STAI change score and the general STAI change score was not 
significant (t(1,79) = -.06, ns) indicating that the two scenarios were equally effective in inducing 
anxiety.  
Counterfactual direction 
Participants’ counterfactual thoughts were coded as either downward or upward by two 
judges, one of whom was blind to the study hypothesis. Upward counterfactuals referred to 
things that would have made the situation better (e.g., “If only I had gone to the doctor sooner”) 
whereas downward counterfactuals referred to things that would have made the situation worse 
(e.g., At least I went to the doctor before it really got worse.”).  The level of agreement on the 
counterfactual coding was 97.5 percent. Any differences in coding were resolved through 
discussion.  
 For this study, the number of upward relative to downward counterfactuals was of main 
interest rather than the number of each type of counterfactual generated. Although it was 
expected that the anxiety induction would lead to the generation of more upward counterfactuals 
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overall3, it was hypothesized that procrastination would be associated with the tendency to make 
more downward and relatively fewer upward counterfactuals in response to an anxiety provoking 
event. Similar to other counterfactual research (Roese, 1994; Sanna et al., 1999), an index of 
relative counterfactual direction was calculated by subtracting the number of downward 
counterfactuals from the number of upward counterfactual for each scenario. An overall index of 
counterfactual direction was also calculated from the mean number of upward and downward 
counterfactuals from the two scenarios. Higher positive values on each of these indices indicate a 
tendency to make more upward counterfactuals relative to downward counterfactuals. Each of the 
three counterfactual direction indices became the dependent variables in the regression analyses, 
with trait procrastination and self-esteem as the independent variables.  
Regression analyses 
The correlations between the main variables along with descriptive statistics are presented 
in Table 1. Trait procrastination was negatively related to overall and delay specific 
counterfactual direction, but not to counterfactual direction for the general scenario. 
Procrastination scores were also negatively related to self-esteem, which was in turn negatively 
correlated with the general scenario counterfactual index.  To clarify the unique relations of 
procrastination to counterfactual direction, three separate multiple regressions were then 
conducted with the overall, delay, and general counterfactual direction indices as the dependent 
variables, and procrastination and self-esteem entered together into the regression models. Of 
particular interest were the univariate results for each predictor. Preliminary analyses indicated 
that the findings for each of the three regressions were not moderated by gender and therefore 
this factor is not discussed further.  
Overall anxiety. Overall, the regression model was significant, F(2,77) = 4.71, p = .01 (R2
Procrastination 16
= .11). Both procrastination (E = -.29, t = -2.58, p = .01) and self-esteem (E = -.24, t = -2.21, p = 
.03) were significant unique predictors of counterfactual direction. Thus, trait procrastination was 
associated with a tendency to make more downward counterfactuals and relatively fewer upward 
counterfactuals overall in response to the anxiety provoking situations. Moreover, this 
relationship was independent of global self-esteem which separately predicted making more 
downward counterfactuals overall. This finding supported the first hypothesis that procrastination 
is related to avoiding thoughts about how things could have been better in response to anxiety.  
General anxiety. The overall model of the predictors regressed on counterfactual 
direction generated in response to the general anxiety scenario was significant overall (F(2,77) = 
4.33, p < .02, R2 = .10). However, this was mainly due to a significant main effect of self-esteem 
on counterfactual direction (E = -.29, t = -2.65, p <.01). There was also a non-significant trend 
towards a main effect of procrastination on counterfactual direction (E = -.21, t = -1.85, p = 
.068). This suggests that procrastination may be modestly associated with making more 
downward counterfactuals in response to anxiety experienced from a general, non-delay related 
situation of uncertainty after controlling for effects due to self-esteem. 
Delay-specific anxiety. The overall regression model predicting delay-specific 
counterfactual direction revealed a non-significant trend (F(2,77) = 2.57, p = .08, R2 = .06) for 
both variables entered together. However, this trend was mostly due to the main effects of 
procrastination on counterfactual direction. As expected procrastination uniquely predicted 
making more downward and relatively fewer upward counterfactuals (E = -.26, t = -2.25, p < 
.03), whereas self-esteem did not (E = -.09, t = -.78, ns). This suggests that the association 
between procrastination and making more downward counterfactuals and relatively fewer 
upward counterfactuals4 may be related to self-enhancement motives (mood repair) in response 
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to self-concept threat that is specific to procrastinating behavior. 
Procrastinating behavior and counterfactual direction 
With a larger sample size, the non-significant trend towards procrastination being 
associated with fewer upward counterfactuals in the general anxiety scenario may have reached 
significance. Thus, the possibility that the relation between procrastination and counterfactual 
direction is due to mood repair in general and not specifically when negative outcomes are 
associated with procrastinating behavior cannot be completely ruled out. Given that the simple 
correlation between procrastination and counterfactual direction was apparently larger for the 
delay-specific anxiety scenario (r = -.24) than for the general anxiety scenario (r = -.14), it is 
tempting to conclude that self-enhancement motives are perhaps more salient when the negative 
outcome is self-relevant. To clarify if the relationship between procrastination and counterfactual 
direction was indeed stronger in the delay specific scenario than in the general scenario a test of 
significance was performed.  
Following the method outlined by Meng, Rosenthal, & Rubin (1992), a test of the 
difference in the size of the correlations between procrastination and counterfactual direction for 
each scenario was conducted using z-scores based on a Fisher r to z transformation. This 
approach for comparing correlated correlation coefficients is proposed to be an accurate and 
simple alternative to the traditional Hotelling’s t test (1940) without its associated limitations 
(Meng et al., 1992).  The test indicated a significant difference in the size of the correlations for 
each scenario (z = 2.10, p < .05), indicating that procrastination was more related to making more 
upward counterfactuals when anxiety was delay-specific than when anxiety was more general. 
Discussion 
The pattern of results from the current study supports the proposal that downward 
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counterfactuals may be associated with negative behavioral styles such as procrastination. 
Further, this study presents a preliminary view of the possible self-motive involved in this 
relationship. Overall, procrastination was associated with making more downward 
counterfactuals and relatively fewer upward counterfactuals in response to anxiety provoking 
events. When faced with the anxiety provoking situations, procrastinators tended to focus on how 
the situation could have been worse but was not (downward counterfactuals) perhaps to avoid 
distressing thoughts about how things may have been better (upward counterfactuals), and to 
restore positive mood through the generation of downward counterfactuals. Thus, mood repair in 
general may be a way for procrastinators to escape or avoid their unpleasant state, a conclusions 
that is in line with research suggesting that procrastination is linked to avoiding rather than 
dealing with stressors (Milgram et al., 1994; Sirois & Pychyl, 2002).   
Procrastinators were also more likely to make downward counterfactuals when the 
situation involved delaying seeking medical care for an annoying skin problem. This result was 
found after controlling for the effects of global self-esteem on counterfactual direction, 
suggesting that specific rather than global self-threat was involved. One interpretation is that the 
delay in the medical scenario effectively manipulated a self-relevant threat for the procrastinators 
that resulted in an attempt to restore a positive sense of self by making more downward 
counterfactuals. The relevance of this particular type of delay for procrastinators is further 
evidenced by recent work demonstrating that procrastinators tend to delay seeking medical care 
for a variety of health problems (Sirois et al., in press). This interpretation is also consistent with 
the self-motive model of counterfactual direction (Sanna et al., 2001) which proposes that  
downward counterfactuals can serve a self-enhancement function. Further, self-enhancement, the 
search for favorable information about the self, can occur through repairing, maintaining or 
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protecting one’s self concept (Sedikides & Strube, 1997). After reading about the possible 
negative consequences of failing to act in a timely manner, individuals high in trait 
procrastination may have restored a positive sense of self by focusing on how things could have 
been worse (“At least I went to the doctor before it really got worse”) but were not. That 
procrastination was more related to counterfactual direction in the delay-specific than in the 
general anxiety scenario further suggests that downward counterfactuals may play a role in the 
maintenance of procrastinating behavior.   
Ironically, the mood-regulating function of downward counterfactuals may be potentially 
dysfunctional for procrastinators if, as some researchers have suggested, the preference for 
downward counterfactuals comes at the expense of upward counterfactuals (Boninger et al., 
1994; Markman et al., 1993; Roese, 1994; Sanna, 1996). This preference may lessen the potential 
for recognition of ways to correct future behavior (i.e., not delaying and taking timely action to 
deal with a problem). Rather than be admonished by the consequences of their behavior, 
procrastinators may focus on how outcomes could have been worse but were not, and are 
therefore able to preserve a positive sense of self.   
In additional to the affective benefits of downward counterfactuals, engaging in 
downward counterfactuals may also have motivational implications for procrastinators. Recent 
work by McMullen and Markman (2000) suggest that thinking about how things could have been 
worse may differentially influence motivation to change behavior depending on the focus of the 
mental simulation. Across three studies, affective assimilation following downward 
counterfactuals (focusing on the worse than reality possibility) not only evoked negative affect, 
but served as a wake-up call that could motivate behavior change to avoid the possible worse 
outcome. Conversely, affective contrast of downward counterfactuals (focusing on the reality and 
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not the worse possibility) yielded positive affect and a Pangloss effect – complacency and 
diminished motivation to change behavior because potential problems are glossed over.  
According to McMullen and Markman’s (2000) counterfactual motivational model, the 
findings of the current study along with research demonstrating that procrastination is associated 
with mood regulating trade-offs (Blunt & Pychyl, 2000; Tice et al., 2001) suggest that a 
preference for downward counterfactuals may contribute to a lack of motivation to change 
procrastinating behavior. For example, if a negative outcome occurs because an important task 
was delayed, focusing on how things were not as bad as they could have been not only makes the 
procrastinator feel better about the negative outcome, but also engenders a sense of satisfaction 
and complacency that may result in less thought about how to act in a more timely manner in the 
future. By not engaging in affective assimilation of the possibility of worse outcomes, 
procrastinators may not receive the “wake-up call” that their behavior needs to be changed. This 
trade-off of immediate affective benefits for loss of preparative insights for future behavior and 
decreased motivation to change may, in the case of procrastinators, perpetuate the very self-
regulation difficulties that characterize these individuals.  
Replication of these findings across different situations of delay and non-delay along with 
an assessment of counterfactual focus is needed to clarify the conclusions suggested by these 
results and to further delineate the contributions of self-motives to counterfactual trade-offs for 
procrastinators. For example, it is likely that self-presentational and motivational processes 
interconnect in the genesis of counterfactuals (Roese & Olson, 1993). Given the proclivity of 
procrastinators for strategic self-presentation (Ferrari, 1991b, 1991d; Ferrari, 1992a), a fruitful 
line of inquiry may be to investigate whether the tendency to make more downward 
counterfactuals is enhanced when social evaluation of procrastinating behavior is anticipated.  
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Limitations and implications 
 One limitation of the current research is that hypothetical scenarios rather than real life 
events were used to generate the counterfactual responses. This could lead to the participants 
responding in ways that they might not normally respond. However, as Kasmatis and Wells 
(1995) have argued, if the artificiality of the scenarios did influence responses this way, then the 
pattern of results demonstrating self-enhancement strategies would not have been obtained. (i.e., 
individuals who procrastinate would not have engaged in relatively more downward 
counterfactuals for the delay scenario if their self-concept was not threatened). However, other 
studies that have examined individual differences and counterfactual direction using recalled 
experiences (Markman et al., 1993; Roese, 1994), and performance (Sanna, 1996) have found 
similar patterns of results, suggesting that the current findings may mirror those found in real life 
situations. 
 The association between counterfactual thinking and procrastination suggested by the 
current study may be specific to anxiety and not to other negative mood states. For example, 
Curtis (1989) found anxiety was related to a variety of self-defeating behaviors, which can 
include procrastinating behavior. Moreover, Baumeister and Scher (1988) propose that anxiety is 
linked to tradeoffs, behaviors where short-term benefits are chosen at the risk of long-term costs. 
Procrastination can be viewed as a type of trade-off (Lay & Silverman, 1996), as can a preference 
for downward counterfactuals if opportunities to reflect on corrective actions for the future are 
diminished (Boninger et al., 1994; Markman et al., 1993; Roese, 1994; Sanna, 1996). Thus, the 
trade-off reflected in the preference of procrastinators for downward counterfactuals may be a 
response that is unique to anxiety that does not occur when other negative emotions such as 
depressive affect are experienced. Distinguishing the role of anxiety versus other negative 
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emotions in counterfactual trade-offs is an interesting area for future research. 
 A notable contribution of the current study is that it is one of the first to demonstrate a 
relationship between counterfactual thinking and a negative behavior pattern, procrastination. 
Several studies suggest that a propensity towards making upward counterfactuals may be linked 
to greater distress and rumination following a traumatic event (Davis & Lehman, 1995; Davis, 
Lehman, Wortman, Silver, & Thompson, 1995). In contrast, investigations of the negative 
correlates of downward counterfactuals have been neglected, perhaps because the positive 
affective consequences of downward counterfactuals have until recently been viewed as less 
troublesome than the negative affective consequences of their upward counterparts. However, 
from a behavioral and motivational perspective, the consequence of engaging in thoughts that 
serve to improve mood and protect self-concept is that the individual is rewarded for any 
associated self-regulatory lapses (e.g., Tice et al., 2001). This in turn may encourage and 
maintain the negative behavior pattern, as well as diminish motivation to change behavior 
(McMullen & Markman, 2000).  
 It is possible that other negative behavior styles associated with self-enhancing motives 
and anxiety regulation may also be related to preferring downward counterfactuals in response to 
negative outcomes. For example, self-handicapping which has been linked to procrastination 
(Ferrari, 1992a), may also be related to a preference for downward counterfactuals. Like 
procrastinators, self-handicappers are concerned with self-presentation (Tice & Baumeister, 
1990), engage in self-protective strategies (Jones & Berglas, 1978), and report anxiety in 
response to their own negative behaviors (Thompson & Richardson, 2001). After strategically 
placing obstacles in the way of successful performance so that poor performance is attributed to 
external rather than internal causes, it is possible that self-handicappers may also engage in 
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downward counterfactuals to cope with any residual affective disturbance or threat to self from 
their poor performance (“I could have done a lot worse, considering the circumstances”).  
As in most scenario studies, the current study does not clarify all of the issues regarding 
how downward counterfactuals may be related to negative behaviors, but instead offers a starting 
point from which more programmatic research may emerge (see Roese & Olson, 1995). For 
example, Sanna (2000) has proposed a conceptual framework for situating individual differences 
in counterfactual direction that also integrates the preferred focus (assimilation or contrast) and 
the time of the mental simulation (prefactual or counterfactual). Following this model, questions 
regarding the counterfactual strategies and the underlying self-motives of procrastinators could 
be further addressed by examining the types of prefactuals preferred as well as the affective and 
motivational consequences. Although the current findings suggest that affective contrast of 
downward counterfactuals may occur following procrastinating behavior and may decrease 
motivation to change behavior, assessing affect following counterfactual generation as well as 
the intentions to take action on future behaviors would provide a more direct test of this 
conclusion.  
Further, the role of upward and downward prefactuals and their focus for procrastinators 
is unclear. One possibility is that procrastinators may assimilate upward prefactuals, imaging 
themselves as having completed their tasks and therefore become complacent about taking 
concrete action. Given that procrastination has been linked to wishful thinking, especially when 
the task was unpleasant (Sigall, Kruglanski, & Fyock, 2000), this possibility seems reasonable. 
However, procrastinators could also be assimilating downward prefactuals about an impending 
task thereby fearing that the worse will transpire and accordingly delaying the task.  This 
perspective is in accordance with recent research that found that greater procrastination during 
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job-seeking over a six month period was associated with increases in hopeless feelings about 
successfully finding a job during that period (Senecal & Guay, 2000). Both possibilities have 
motivational implications that, in addition to a preference for downward counterfactuals, could 
provide insight into the prefactual and counterfactual strategies of procrastinators. Similar to 
other studies of individual differences in counterfactual thinking (Sanna, 1996), these issues 
could be addressed by examining the prefactuals of procrastinators in response to an actual 
impending task and then eliciting counterfactual responses to subsequent performance and 
procrastination.    
Overall, the current study offers a preliminary glimpse of one of the negative outcomes 
that may be associated with downward counterfactuals, and presents suggestive evidence about 
how downward counterfactual trade-offs may be linked to self-defeating behavior styles such as 
procrastination. In addition, this study contributes to a growing understanding of the role of 
individual differences in counterfactual thinking (Kasimatis & Wells, 1995; Roese & Olson, 
1993; Sanna, 1996; Sanna, 2000). Future investigations are needed to confirm the current 
findings, and to explore if the relationships suggested here extend to other negative states and 
behavior styles such as self-handicapping, where the functional aspects of downward 
counterfactuals (e.g., affective self-enhancement) may become dysfunctional if they are used to 
reward and maintain self-defeating behavior.  
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Foot notes 
1 By using the scenario to both induce mood and solicit counterfactuals it was felt that 
this would more accurately reflect the circumstances in which counterfactuals are made in natural 
settings. That is, a negative event occurs that gives rise to mood changes, which then may elicit 
counterfactual thoughts about the event. Other researchers have used retrospective accounts of 
experienced negative events to achieve a similar aim. Use of the scenarios rather than actual 
events allowed for greater control over the negative emotion experienced (anxiety), as well as for 
a comparison of reactions across two types of anxiety provoking events. 
2  Preliminary analysis indicated a chance finding that the baseline STAI scores were not 
equal between the two presentation order groups. It was decided therefore to run several more 
participants to equate the baseline STAI scores. 
3An examination of the mean number of counterfactuals generated by participants for 
each scenario supported this assertion. More upward counterfactuals were generated across both 
scenarios (M = 3.57, SD = 1.53) than downward counterfactuals (M = 2.34, SD = 1.38). This 
pattern was preserved across each of the general and delay-specific scenarios with more upward 
counterfactuals (M = 3.35, SD = 1.92; M = 3.80, SD = 1.66) generated than downward 
counterfactuals (M = 2.58, SD = 1.52; M = 2.11, 1.76) for each scenario respectively.  
4 The counterfactual direction index provides a measure of relative counterfactual 
direction (upward to downward counterfactuals) that implies that making more of one type of 
counterfactual means necessarily making fewer of the other type. Additional analyses were 
conducted to examine which type of counterfactual was influencing the direction of 
counterfactuals made by procrastinators. After controlling for self-esteem, results from the 
regression analyses for each of the mean number counterfactual indices produced a similar 
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pattern of main effects to those obtained for the counterfactual direction indices. The analyses 
indicated that the associations of procrastination with counterfactual direction were due mainly to 
making more downward counterfactuals for the delay-specific scenario (E = .23, t = 2.01., p 
<.05) and overall (E = .20, t = 1.80, p = .07).  
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Table 1.  Zero-order correlations between procrastination, self-esteem, and the counterfactual 
direction indices  
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Procrastination --- 
2. Self-esteem -.23* --- 
3. Overall CFT index -.23* -.18 --- 
4. Delay CFT index -.24* -.03 .78** --- 
5. General CFT index -.14 -.25* .82** .29* --- 
M 3.37 3.10 1.24 1.71 .76 
SD   .64   .65 1.86 2.21 2.41 
Note:  N = 80, CFT = counterfactual thoughts 
*p < .05 
**p < .01 
